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Abstract
Th   e paper prepares new estimates for the elasticity of US trade ﬂ  ows using bilateral, commodity-detailed trade data for 31 
countries, using measures of expenditure and trade prices matched to commodity groups, and including a commodity-and-
country speciﬁ  c proxy for global supply-cum-variety. Using the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN 
Comtrade) we construct bilateral trade ﬂ  ows for 31 countries in four categories of goods based on the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’s “end-use” classiﬁ  cation system—autos, industrial supplies and materials–excluding energy, consumer goods, and capital 
goods. We ﬁ  nd that using expenditure matched to commodity category yields more plausible values for the demand elasticities 
than does using GDP as the measure of demand that drives trade ﬂ  ows. Controlling for country and commodity ﬁ  xed eﬀ  ects, 
we ﬁ  nd that industrial and developing countries have demand elasticities that are statistically signiﬁ  cant and that generally 
diﬀ  er between development groups and across product categories. Relative prices for the industrial countries have plausible 
parameter values, are statistically signiﬁ  cant and diﬀ  er across product groups, but the relative prices for developing countries are 
poorly estimated. We ﬁ  nd that variety is an important variable for the behavior of capital goods trade. Because the commodity 
composition of trade and of trading partners has changed dramatically, particularly for imports, we ﬁ  nd that the demand elasticity 
for imports is not constant. Comparing the in-sample performance of the disaggregated model against a benchmark that uses 
aggregated data and GDP as the expenditure variable, our disaggregated model predicts exports better in-sample but does not 
predict imports as well as the benchmark model. 
Note: Th   is paper was prepared for the NBER Project “G-7 Current Accounts: Sustainability and Adjustment.” Th   e authors thank 
Jaime Marquez, Menzie Chinn, and David Roodman, who were invaluable in answering econometric questions, but
are not responsible for errors.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By early 2005, US net trade had been in deficit for more than 25 years and was on a trajectory for more than 
$700 billion for the year. In dollar terms, this was the largest deficit of any country ever; as a share of GDP, it 
was much larger than ever experienced by a large industrial country. Pundits, policymakers, financiers, and 
researchers want to know how the trade deficit got so large. They are even more interested in its future path.  
Empirical modeling of the determinants of trade flows using the “elasticities” approach has a very 
long history in international economics and is used both to explain the past and to project the future. Key 
ingredients of this model are the elasticity of demand for exports and imports with respect to economic 
activity, the elasticity of exports and imports with respect to relative prices, and the influence of other factors, 
including global supply and increased variety.  
Have there been any changes in the nature of US trade to warrant more analysis in this vein? An 
examination of US trade patterns over the last 25 years finds that the commodity and country composition of 
trade have changed, particularly on the import side. A changing country and commodity composition of trade 
may be particularly important to understand both the widening of the trade deficit and its future trajectory. 
Country composition may affect comparative advantage as new global supply comes on-line and new trading 
partners appear, and because differences in exchange rate regimes across countries may affect movements of 
relative prices. Commodity composition may matter because of differences in relative price elasticities on 
account of product heterogeneity. In addition, for both country and commodity composition, differences in 
growth rates of different categories of expenditure (particularly as reflected in long-time systematic deviation 
between production and absorption) in the United States compared with that of US trading partners could be 
particularly important in explaining the dynamics of US trade.  
This paper considers whether measures of economic activity other than GDP better model observed 
trade flows. It investigates whether income and relative price elasticities of US trade differ by trading partner 
or commodity category. It asks whether new estimates of key parameters improve the forecast performance 
of the trade equations. Our strategy creates a database of bilateral trade data for 31 countries, aggregates these 
detailed flows into four  categories of goods based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) “end-use” 
classification system—autos;  industrial supplies and materials, excluding energy (ISM-ex); consumer goods; 
and capital goods. We employ trade prices and measures of expenditure that match these commodity 
categories and include a country-by-commodity proxy for global supply-cum-variety.  
We find that using expenditure matched by commodity category is a superior measure of economic 
activity compared with using GDP and yields far more plausible values for the demand elasticities. We find 
that the demand and relative-price elasticities differ between industrial and developing countries and across 
the four commodity categories. Because the commodity composition of trade and of trading partners has 
changed, particularly for imports, we find that the demand elasticity for imports is not constant. We find that 
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commodity categories. We find that variety is an important variable for the behavior of capital goods trade.  
Comparing the in-sample performance of the model that disaggregates by product group, 
differentiates by income group, and uses matched expenditure and trade price against a benchmark model 
that uses aggregated data and GDP as the expenditure variable, our disaggregated model predicts exports 
better in-sample but does not predict imports as well as the benchmark. Within product groups, auto trade 
and consumer goods imports are least well explained in-sample by the disaggregated model. But, in-sample 
predictions of consumer goods exports, ISM-ex trade flows, and capital goods trade are better than the 
predictions of a model that uses GDP as the measure of economic activity.  
The new elasticities yield insights into the sources of the widening of the US trade deficit and have 
implications going forward for policymakers’ approach to demand management and global trade imbalances. 
Estimated demand elasticities across commodity categories and trading partners imply that if US consumers 
“saved more,” this likely would be a more important factor in changing the trajectory of the trade deficit than 
if the other industrial economies “grew more,” considering a common metric of a one-percentage point 
increase. The differences in estimated relative price elasticities across trading partners and commodities, in 
conjunction with complementary research on exchange rate pass-through undertaken by other authors 
(Campa and Goldberg 2004, Marazzi et al. 2005), imply that exchange rate valuations of developing countries 
need to lead to more trade-price variability to appreciably narrow the US trade deficit.  
The next section of the paper briefly reviews the vast literature on modeling US international trade, 
focusing on the workhorse model of income and relative prices, including its more recent variations that 
include proxies for global supply and variety. Section III presents and discusses data on the US trade deficit 
that show changes in country and commodity composition of trade, which initiated this investigation. Section 
IV discusses our newly constructed data. Section V presents the econometric approach. Section VI discusses 
results and summarizes findings. Section VII presents some implications and notes areas for further work.  
 
 II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The classic workhorse model for estimating trade elasticities has been used since at least the 1940s (Adler 
1945 and 1946, Chang 1945–46). It relates the volume of exports or imports to real foreign and domestic 
income and relative prices (in log form):  
 
price rel income trade . ln ln ln 2 1 β β α + + = . 
 
The model assumes that domestic and foreign tradable goods are imperfect substitutes, that price 
homogeneity holds (e.g., that an estimated coefficient on the trade price and domestic price are equal, thus 
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income) and relative prices are constant over time (see Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez 2000 for a concise 
summary of the model). 
All studies find—as expected—that an increase in domestic economic activity (“income”) will raise 
the domestic demand for imports and that an increase in foreign economic activity (“income”) will raise the 
foreign demand for domestic exports. A rise in the relative price of imports to the domestic substitute will 
reduce demand for imports and a rise in the relative price of a country’s export good to the foreign 
competing good will dampen the demand for exports.  
The sizes of the coefficients on income and relative price vary greatly by study, time period, countries 
analyzed, coverage of commodity groups, and as to whether different or additional explanatory variables are 
in the model. Most studies estimate that the income elasticity for US exports is smaller than the income 
elasticity for US imports and in this regard replicate the earliest and most well-known finding by H.S. 
Houthakker and Stephen Magee. Subsequent studies often estimate higher export and import elasticities than 
the original findings but surprisingly find that the ratio of the import to export elasticity varies relatively little 
from the 1.7 found by Houthakker and Magee in 1969.1  
Despite the empirical persistence of this asymmetry, and its concomitant value for intermediate-term 
projections of US trade flows, it is not consistent with a global long-run equilibrium. The estimates imply that 
if the United States and the rest of the world grow at the same pace (long-run convergence), the US trade 
deficit would worsen, absent a trend change in relative prices.2 Researchers continue to investigate US trade 
flows and the Houthakker-Magee puzzle by examining different data samples, considering more precise 
measures for certain variables, employing different estimation techniques, and adding new independent 
variables to the basic Houthakker and Magee specification. 
One approach to the Houthakker-Magee puzzle is to take on directly the changes in the commodity 
composition of US trade over the past 25 years by estimating import and export equations for different 
categories of goods and services and/or different groups of trading partners. If the country-and-commodity 
composition of a country’s trade has changed significantly over time, one might expect that trade elasticities, 
specifically for the United States, are not constant. For example, researchers have found different income and 
price elasticities for different product categories (see Stone 1979 and Marquez 2002 for different goods 
                                                 
1Houthakker and Magee estimated the US income elasticity for total imports of 1.7 (auto-correlation corrected estimate 
in the appendix) and the foreign income elasticity for US exports at around 1. In their survey of import and export 
demand elasticities for the United States, Sawyer and Sprinkle (1996) find income elasticities for total merchandise 
imports ranging from 0.1322 (Welsch 1987) to 4.028 (Wilson and Takacs 1979). Estimates for foreign income elasticities 
for US exports do not vary quite as much; still they range from 0.374 (Stern, Baum, and Greene 1979) to 2.151 (Wilson 
and Takacs 1979). The median (mean) estimate of the 24 studies on total US imports referenced in Sawyer and Sprinkle 
is 2.02 (2.14). The median (mean) estimate of the 17 studies on total US merchandise exports referenced in Sawyer and 
Sprinkle is 1.12 (1.02). In one of the more recent studies, Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) find that the long-run 
income elasticities for US exports and imports are 0.8 and 1.8, respectively, and are stable over time. 
2 Krugman and Baldwin (1987), among others, make this observation and discuss implications.  
  4categories; see Sawyer and Sprinkle 1996 for a survey; see Deardorff et al. 2001 and Mann 2004 for services). 
Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez  (2000) cannot reject the hypothesis that the US trade elasticities are constant 
over time, but they hold the country composition of trade fixed at the 1995 shares and because of data 
availability and the objective of the study, focus on industrial-country trade. Using a century of data, Marquez 
(1999) finds that the elasticity with respect to income for US imports varies over time as trade openness 
affects the share of imports in expenditure.  
Researchers have also focused on “the notorious inadequacies of import and export price indexes” 
(Houthakker and Magee 1969, 112). Relative price measures used most often to proxy for domestic 
substitutes for the traded product—the GDP deflator and the wholesale price index—introduce bias because 
both include a considerable share of nontraded goods (Goldstein and Khan 1985). Moreover, conventional 
price indexes for traded goods are too aggregated to reflect new product introductions and may not take 
account of the effect of changes in global supply on prices and therefore on demand, which apparently have 
been important features of current data.3 Incorporating different price indexes changes the estimated income 
elasticities in the workhorse model. In particular, Feenstra’s (1994) detailed work on prices of six narrowly 
defined manufacturing goods substantially reduced the estimated income elasticity of US import demand for 
these six products.4 And Marquez’s (2002) variable constructed using both Feenstra’s price-index 
methodology and a variant on the relative capital stock term originally used in Helkie and Hooper (1988) 
reduced income elasticities for US imports of producer goods but not of services or consumer goods.  
As an alternative to constructing new price indexes, researchers have put auxiliary variables in the 
standard regression—focusing almost exclusively on the US import equation even though the theory should 
be equally relevant for the US export equation—to account for changes to both the supply and demand 
sides.5 The theoretical backdrop in conjunction with the empirical research to date gives conflicting 
hypotheses for the sign and size of any supply-cum-variety variable. In the global supply shift story, new 
trading countries increase global supply, which reduces prices, and thus increases demand for their exports. 
                                                 
3 Broda and Weinstein (2004) show that between 1972 and 2002 the number of “varieties” imported by the United 
States increased by 252 percent (p. 15), with an important source of the new varieties being the entry into global trade of 
dynamic emerging-market economies including China, Taiwan, Korea, India, and Mexico. Hummels and Klenow (2004) 
find that as countries industrialize and grow, not only do their exports increase in nominal value but also the breadth of 
variety these countries offer to the world widens. Schott (2004) shows that varieties within a product set differ 
systematically across countries, with higher unit-value varieties coming from countries with higher productivity.  
4 Feenstra considers imports of men’s leather athletic shoes, men’s and boys’ cotton knit shirts, stainless steel bars, 
carbon steel sheets, color television receivers, and portable typewriters, and for comparison purposes gold and silver 
bullion, between 1967 and 1987. He treats as variety a good from a particular country (often termed the Armington 
assumption) and calculates each variety’s share in actual US expenditure and the US elasticity of substitution between 
those different varieties. This method takes account of the new varieties produced (in this case, equivalently new trading 
partners) and exported in ever greater quantities by developing countries, for example. 
5 Gagnon (2003a) estimates regressions for US exports using a supply variable; but his results for US exports are less 
robust and less stable across samples than his results for US imports (pp. 13 and 16).  
  5According to Paul Krugman’s (1989) “45-degree rule,”6 fast-growing countries will not experience a 
deterioration of their trade balance (and therefore face steady depreciation of their currency) because as they 
grow, they produce more varieties with increasing returns to scale. Since consumers love varieties, given 
income, the apparent demand curve for the varieties shifts out and there is no deterioration in the terms of 
trade. Peter Schott (2004) finds that fast-growing countries with high productivity growth produce varieties 
that are high unit-value, so for them the demand curve is not only shifting out but also tilting in their favor.  
All told, the “classic” workhorse model (of equation 1 above) using the standard complement of 
income and relative prices may not take account of the effect that trading partners’ supply or variety of 
exports have had on US import prices and/or import demand. The US import elasticity would tend to be 
overestimated to the extent that some of the explanation for the rising share of imports in US GDP lies with 
increased foreign supply (and thus lower prices and thus more demand for imports); and some of the 
explanation comes from increased domestic taste for variety, holding income constant. Researchers have 
implemented the global supply-cum-variety measure using several variables.  
 
•  Helkie and Hooper (1988) use the ratio of home to foreign productive capital stocks to represent 
exporters’ increased capacity to supply more new products to the US market. Their new variable 
significantly reduces the inequality between income elasticities for US imports and exports for the time 
period of their estimation but later declines in significance tests.  
 
•  Bayoumi (1999) includes exporters’ GDP in a panel estimation for trade flows between 21 industrial 
countries. He finds that this supply effect is significant and increases in the longer run,7 whereas the 
importer’s income elasticity decreases over time.  
 
•  Marquez (2002) considers “immigration” as a proxy for American consumers’ tastes for varieties from 
abroad. With a growing share of immigrants in the population, he posits, US demand for imports from 
immigrants’ home countries must be higher, with other things held equal. Including the immigration 
variable does reduce the US income elasticities for services and consumer goods imports.  
 
•  Gagnon, in three recent papers (2003a, 2003b, 2004), finds a significant supply effect (defined as potential 
output growth or relative GDP of the exporting country). Omitting this variety variable leads him to 
overestimate the coefficient on income in a US import regression.  
                                                 
6 It is called the “45-degree rule” because the growth rates and the ratio of export to import income elasticities for 
countries can be plotted as a 45-degree line between two axes. 
7 The fact that the coefficient on exporters’ output increases with increasing lags shows that it is the exporting countries’ 
potential growth that determines its capacity to supply variety, not short-run fluctuations in growth rates. 
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•  Cline (2005) puts the trading-partner GDP into the workhorse model and finds that it reduces the 
income elasticities in US trade equations for both exports and imports.  
 
To summarize, closer attention to changes in trading partners and commodity composition of trade, 
using more disaggregated trade prices, and taking better account of global supply and/or demand for variety 
are the predominant directions of the research undertakings to date. We will continue in these directions and 
also investigate the “income” variable itself, collecting data that better matches this variable to the 
disaggregated commodity and country composition of trade. So, there are five dimensions for our analysis: 
trading partner, composition of trade, variety-cum-global supply, measures of economic activity, and trade 
prices.  
  
III. GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A DISAGGREGATED APPROACH  
 
Figure 1 is a key spur to this investigation. It shows the US trade deficit disaggregated into BEA’s end-use 
categories of capital goods, ISM-ex, consumer goods, and autos and auto parts. (For completeness, the figure 
also shows net trade in two categories of services and in “other”—petroleum and agricultural products.) The 
deterioration of the US trade balance has been trending by end-use categories, with the bulk of the 
deterioration in the trade deficit due to a widening deficit in autos, consumer goods, and oil. If the 
commodity shares of trade are unchanged, if the country composition of trade is unchanged, and if the 
income elasticities of trade are unchanged, then we should not see this differential widening of the trade 
deficit across product groups. Hence our investigation into the changing commodity-and-country 
composition of trade.  
Table 1 (detail in appendix figures A1.1 and A1.2) decomposes the trade deficit into BEA’s commodity 
composition of trade for imports and exports. The largest categories of both imports and exports are capital 
goods and ISM-ex. From 1980 to 2004, the share of capital goods rose and that of ISM-ex fell. Capital goods 
is a particularly interesting category because of the potential importance of changing global supply and variety. 
Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, global investment cycles may differ from global GDP cycles, 
with consequences for US capital goods exports and imports. Consumer goods is a large category with a 
dramatic increase in the share of US imports, rising from 14 to 25 percent in 25 years. The share of consumer 
goods in total merchandise exports rose only modestly and accounts for only 13 percent of exports. 
Consumer goods constitute a particularly interesting category because of the potential role of changes in 
country source of supply. Moreover, from a macroeconomic perspective, differential growth in personal 
consumption expenditures in the United States versus in trading partners may be an important factor in the 
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been rising as a share of GDP.  
Table 2 (detail in appendix figures A2.1 and A2.2) shows that  the country composition of trade, 
particularly of imports, has changed dramatically. Trade with the industrial countries in general has stayed 
relatively stable, with the share of imports remaining at about 50 percent and that of exports falling from 60 
to 54 percent (1980–2004). Within the industrial-country group, exports to Europe and Japan have fallen. 
The share of imports from certain countries and regions has changed dramatically, with the share of imports 
from China increasing from 1 to 13 percent over the period, the share of exports to non-China and non-
Japan Asia doubling to 11 percent, and the share of trade with Latin America (less Mexico) contracting.  
Putting commodity and country together, the large size of the capital goods trade, the large increase 
in the consumer goods share of imports and of the trade deficit, and the changing shares of trade with 
countries in Asia, as well as with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners, suggests 
that closer inspection of trade flows by country and commodity is warranted. However, BEA does not 
publish bilateral trade data by merchandise categories. The Census Bureau’s published trade data by category 
and trade partner does not extend further back than 1995, and the United States International Trade 
Commission (USITC) database covers bilateral trade by product only from 1989. Hence we turn to another 
comprehensive source of a long time-series of data to analyze the changing commodity-and-country 
composition of US trade.  
 
IV. OUR DATABASE ON US TRADE COMMODITY-BY-COUNTRY  
 
Our database includes (1) a 31-country sample of bilateral trade with the United States aggregated into proxy 
end-use categories; (2) expenditure data matched by country and proxy end-use category; (3) trade prices 
matched by end use and relative prices matched by country and end use; and (4) “variety” in each proxy end-
use category.  
 
Constructing Bilateral Trade Data  
 
To approximate our initial observations from BEA data, and because we use their trade price indexes, we re-
create BEA’s end-use categories using the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC, Revision 2-, 4-, 
and 5-digit), which in the United Nations Comtrade database spans the longest time period.  
To match BEA’s end-use commodity groups, we use Comtrade’s raw materials and intermediate 
goods for our “ISM-ex” category; “capital goods” encompasses most of SITC chapter 7 and some categories 
in chapter 8; “autos” includes passenger vehicles and their parts from chapter 7; and “consumer goods” is 
made up almost entirely of the categories comprising chapter 8. We excluded all of chapter 3 (energy) and all 
  8of chapter 1 (food) as these are also excluded from BEA’s end-use categories that are the focus of our 
graphical evidence. Table A1 in the appendix shows the complete list.  
For our econometric technique, we need a uniform panel with the same set of countries for each of 
the proxy end-use groups for both imports and exports. To select countries to include in the database, we 
start with bilateral trade between the United States and partner countries by each 4-digit or 5-digit SITC 
category. For each country reporting trade data to the United Nations, we calculated its share in US total 
merchandise imports and total merchandise exports and its share in trade in each of our four proxy end-use 
commodity groups. Of all countries in the database, we selected those that represented the first 90 percent of 
trade in each category. We excluded most of the Middle East because of the suspicion that trade with these 
countries might not be well-estimated with the standard workhorse model. We excluded the countries of the 
former Soviet Union because there are insufficient data on expenditure and prices. We also excluded South 
Africa. Hence, our sample of bilateral trade pairs includes 31 countries from Asia and the Pacific, North 
America, Latin America, and Western Europe.8  
Because of our intended econometric approach, some variation in country composition across the 
commodity groups is ignored. For example, Bangladesh, Honduras, and Sri Lanka are excluded; even though 
they are in the first 90 percent of US imports of consumer goods, they were not important trading partners in 
the other end-use categories. At the other extreme, we included 31 countries in US auto imports and exports 
even though the United States trades autos and parts overwhelmingly with Canada, Mexico, Japan, and 
Germany.9
Figure 2 shows one example—imports of capital goods—of how significant is the change over time 
in the country-by-commodity shares. Appendix figures A4.1 to A4.8 show the evolution of commodity-by-
country shares for the complete set of four commodity groups in trade.  
To employ the workhorse model of trade, we need real exports and real imports. We deflate all 
nominal values by the corresponding end-use export and import price indexes from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) International Price Program. 10
 
Constructing Matched Expenditure Variables and Relative Prices  
 
A key part of the analysis is whether the elasticities estimated in the workhorse model differ by the measure 
of economic activity employed. The standard measure of economic activity used in trade equations is real 
                                                 
8 Trade data on 30 countries are from the UN Comtrade database. Data on a comparable basis for Taiwan come from 
that country’s statistical office. 
9 Since we find, in this paper, that the commodity-and-country composition of trade is important for estimated 
coefficients, in a subsequent analysis we will allow the country composition of the commodity groups to vary.  
10 The end-use import and export prices do not differentiate by trading partner. Inspection of some country-specific 
time-series data from BLS rejects the assumption that prices do not vary by trading partner. However, country-specific 
trade-price data are unavailable at sufficient time-series length and are not disaggregated on an end-use basis.  
  9GDP. Although this makes sense in aggregated trade equations, given the commodity focus of this paper, 
superior elasticity estimates may be generated by better matching the activity variable to the traded 
commodity.  
We construct country-specific measures of real consumption expenditure, investment, and GDP 
from the Penn World Tables.11 On the import side, US real GDP, real consumption expenditure, and real 
investment are all from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables. In the estimation, we use 
real consumption expenditures in the trade equations for consumer goods and autos and real investment 
expenditures in the trade equations for ISM-ex and capital goods. (Appendix figure A3.1 compares export-
weighted foreign activity variables with US activity variables.) 
There is another rationale for using a different measure of economic activity than GDP. The 
systematic deterioration of the US current account deficit and the comparable rise in current account 
surpluses around the world (as documented in Truman 2005 and Mann 2005) suggest a systematic bias in 
GDP as a measure of economic activity. For chronic surplus countries, GDP growth as a measure of activity 
generating demand for US exports may be “too high” since domestic demand growth is less than GDP 
growth by the share of net exports in those countries’ GDPs. For the chronic US deficit, GDP growth as a 
measure of activity generating demand for US imports may be “too low” since domestic demand growth is 
greater than GDP growth by the share of net imports in US GDP. A key econometric exercise is to compare 
the estimated demand elasticities across these alternative measures of economic activity, controlling for 
country and commodity–specific effects.  
   In our analysis, we take the relative price variable of the workhorse model (trade price relative to 
domestic competing substitute) as given rather than estimate a system of trade and price equations.12 We 
construct relative prices for US imports as the ratio of the end-use specific import price index and the 
corresponding US “domestic” price index from the BLS: The producer price index (PPI) is used for ISM-ex 
and capital goods. The consumer price index (CPI), excluding energy and food prices,  is used for consumer 
goods and autos. To construct relative export prices, we converted the dollar-based end-use–specific export 
price index into foreign currency using current market exchange rates and divided by the respective trading 
partner’s price index (using CPI or PPI depending on the commodity group). Appendix figures A3.2 and 
A3.3 display the movement of selected relative price variables.  
 
                                                 
11 We generate real measures of expenditure by multiplying the real per capita values by population. Since the Penn data 
only extend through 2000 we use the growth of these expenditure categories from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) deflated by domestic producer price or consumer price indexes to complete the time-series to 2003. For a 
discussion of purchasing power parity (PPP)–adjusted data versus market exchange rate–adjusted data when undertaking 
comparative country analysis, see Castles and Henderson (2005).  
12 Most recent studies estimate prices as part of a set of simultaneous equations (Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez 2000). 
While researchers have always warned of the bias that may be introduced by treating relative prices as exogenous, several 
recent studies could not confirm that the coefficient on economic activity changed when including different 
formulations of this price variable or when allowing for simultaneity.  
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Recent literature has focused on adding variables to the workhorse model, in part to address issues that have 
not been embodied in official price indexes. A global supply variable could account for entry of dynamic 
emerging-market economies into global trade and proxy for an outward shift of the global supply curve, 
which enables the United States to buy more imports at lower prices. A variety variable could account for 
differences in quality of goods within a commodity category and how variety in imports (exports) available to 
US consumers (foreign buyers) has grown. Such quality or variety shifts and changes in taste may not be 
incorporated into the price indexes we use, hence biasing the overall regression.  
Following Broda and Weinstein (2004) as well as Gagnon (2003a, revised 2004), we construct a 
variety proxy by counting the number of SITC 4-digit categories that are included in each proxy end-use 
group for a given country in each year. To compare the growth in variety across countries and categories, we 
set the number of categories equal to 100 in the first year of our panel. Similar to Broda and Weinstein, we 
find that the growth in “variety” was modest for the industrial countries; emerging-market economies on the 
other hand substantially increased their supply of variety to the United States.  
The growth in variety was especially great for capital goods imports—with the number of SITC 
categories provided by China having grown by more than 250 percent.13 In 1980, China provided only 46 
categories under the capital goods heading, “metalworking machine tools” being the biggest in nominal dollar 
terms ($18 million); in 2003, China supplied 125 goods out of 136 4-digit categories in capital goods, with $9 
billion worth of “peripheral automatic data processing units” as the largest and $6 billion of office-machine 
accessories as the second largest category. Varieties from other developing countries have also risen: Capital 
goods variety from non-Japan Asia increased by 76 percent; varieties in consumer goods from the Western 
Hemisphere and Asia increased by 39 and 30 percent, respectively. The United States’ supply to its different 
trading partners behaved similar to that of other industrial countries: Between 1980 and 2003, US exports in 
capital and consumer goods to its export markets grew on average by 10 percent. 
 
V. ECONOMETRIC IMPLEMENTATION  
 
Our panel thus comprises import and export data, activity variables, and relative prices for 31 US partner 
countries, 24 years, and four commodity groups (2,976 observations in all). Each commodity group panel 
contains 31 time-series of country data. The whole panel consists of the four commodity panels stacked on 
top of each other.  
                                                 
13 Broda and Weinstein’s findings are similar. 
  11We use a dynamic panel specification to model bilateral trade flows. Our model allows us to estimate 
both short-term and long-term effects of changes in the explanatory variables—similar to an error correction 
model (ECM) common in time-series estimations: 
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where i denotes the ith trading partner, j denotes the jth commodity group, and t=1980–2003 are the years in 
our sample; the αij’s are the unobserved fixed effects and the uij,t denotes the idiosyncratic error.  
For the short-run effects, the coefficient on the differenced natural logarithms of economic activity 
shows the short-run effect of a 1 percent point change in GDP, investment, or personal consumption 
expenditure on real exports or imports.  
For the long-run relationships, the coefficients on the level logs divided by the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable represent long-run effects; as in the long run, we can set the differenced terms 






















The calculated coefficient on economic activity in this equation shows the effect of a 1 percent increase in 
GDP, investment, or personal consumption expenditure on real trade flows. 
Using a dynamic formulation in a fixed-effects or first-difference context is problematic. The random 
error terms are correlated both with the differences and the level of the lagged dependent variable, thus 
biasing the results for the coefficients. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose an 
estimation method that instruments the lagged levels of the dependent variable with the lagged differences of 
this variable and the differences of the dependent variable with its lagged levels. Our results using this 
instrumental variable technique were poor—mostly likely because the instruments as implemented in this 
technique (lagged change instrumenting for lagged level and lagged level for instrumenting lagged change) 
were poor. Ideally, one might try to estimate this panel using a vector error correction model (VECM) suited 
for dynamic panel data estimation—these techniques go beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, 
Beck 2001, Schich and Pelgrin 2002, and Smith 2000 for estimation of long and wide panels). In future work, 
we may generate the cointegrating vector explicitly using panel dynamic ordinary least squares (OLS) (Mark 
and Sul 2002; Mark, Ogaki, and Sul 2003) and implement the result in a panel ECM.  
The challenge of choosing an econometric technique in the context of dynamic panel data estimation 
is acknowledged in econometric texts. Wooldridge (2002, chapter 11) and Kennedy (2003, 313) discuss the 
  12bias, yet greater precision, of fixed-effects estimators, as opposed to general least squares or instrumental 
variable regressions; studies indicate that the bias induced by fixed effects is offset when the time variable 
exceeds 30 observations. Our time-series is 24 years, and we proceed without corrective action. 
 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
This section discusses the findings of the econometric exercise. We wish to compare estimated coefficients 
for whole panel versus commodity decomposition, over alternative activity variables, consider the role for 
variety and other proxies for global supply, investigate whether industrial and developing countries are 
different in US trade, and examine China in particular.  
 
Benchmark Regression and Matched Expenditure Versus GDP 
 
For the first comparison to previous research, we use the 31-country and four-commodity whole panel with 
country-and-commodity fixed effects to run a benchmark regression for US imports and US exports. An  
F-test of the constrained whole panel against the unconstrained country-and-commodity fixed effects panel 
rejects the null hypothesis that the constrained and unconstrained regressions are the same. Table 3 presents 
short-run and long-run estimates for the elasticity estimates for income and for relative prices from 
representative previous work. Wald tests (see footnote to table 3) test the null hypothesis that the short-run 
and the long-run coefficients are the same. Generally, the null is rejected for the activity variable. For relative 
prices, the null is rejected for exports but not for imports.  
The first question is how our elasticities estimated using our 31-country and four-commodity panel 
and using GDP as the measure of economic activity compares with previous research. Our income elasticities for 
both exports and imports are higher in the short run but are similar to the long-run estimates that come from 
regressions run over sample periods starting from the 1980s, such as Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998). Our 
price elasticities are generally lower than comparable studies, particularly on the export side and often are not 
significant. This may be a result of the construction of our relative price index using the GDP deflator for all 
the categories of trade. (Note that this is not the deflator we construct for subsequent regressions, where we 
instead use matched trade price and deflators.)  
Changing from GDP to matched expenditure as the measure of economic activity and matched prices makes a 
large difference to the estimated income elasticities. Both the short-run and long-run elasticities are much 
lower (with the short-run coefficients almost too low) and the long-run coefficients close to the theoretical 
priors based on constant share of trade in expenditure of about 1.0. This suggests that the GDP variable may 
not be the correct measure of economic activity that drives trade flows. The Houthakker-Magee asymmetry 
with respect to economic activity still persists, both in the short and long runs, but the magnitude of the 
asymmetry is dramatically smaller.  
  13With respect to relative prices, although the regressions with matched expenditure also incorporate 
greater richness with regard to the relative prices (as discussed in the data section), the significance level of 
relative prices does not improve in this panel specification of the four-commodity model.  
Finally, to be further discussed below, we find that the variety variable is statistically significant in the 
regressions for imports and exports implemented with matched expenditure and matched prices but not for 
the export regression using GDP as the measure of activity and the GDP deflators in the measure of relative 
prices.  
 
Disaggregating by Product Categories  
 
Given that the commodity-by-country composition of trade has changed, sometimes dramatically, over time, 
do the coefficients on economic activity, relative prices, and variety vary across product categories? Table 4 
presents regressions by commodity group with country fixed effects and the whole panel estimates with 
country-and-commodity fixed effects, which constrains the nonintercept coefficients across the commodities. 
An F-test of the constrained whole panel with country fixed effects versus the unconstrained split panel with 
country fixed effects rejects the null hypothesis that the constrained and unconstrained regressions are the 
same. Wald tests in general reject the null hypothesis that the short-run and long-run coefficients are the same 
on the matched expenditure variable but do not reject the null hypothesis that the short-run and long-run 
relative price coefficients are the same (excepting that the null is rejected at the 5 percent level for auto 
exports).  
Comparing the elasticities on matched expenditure and variety across the commodity panels: On the 
export side, the short-run elasticities of autos, capital goods, and consumer goods are more than twice that 
for ISM-ex and are greater than the elasticity estimated for the whole panel with country-and-commodity 
fixed effects. The long-run elasticities of consumer goods and autos are greater than the panel estimate. On 
the import side, differences in estimated expenditure elasticities are substantial across the disaggregated 
commodities groups. Comparing the short-run and the long-run estimates, there is evidence of substantial 
cyclical response in excess of the long-run relationship for US imports of consumer goods and autos and auto 
parts. Whereas most of the estimates make sense and are of plausible magnitudes, those for autos seem 
unreasonable, particularly the short-run estimate. Among the estimates throughout this analysis, the auto 
category seems poorly estimated. Based on this analysis that disaggregation of product categories is 
statistically relevant for understanding the drivers of trade flows, our future program of work may allow the 
countries included in each product category to vary, since we will no longer require the uniform panel.  
 
  14Disaggregating Industrial and Developing Countries by Product Group  
  
Not only has the commodity composition of trade changed but there has also been a significant change, 
particularly evident for imports, in the composition of US trade with the industrial versus developing 
countries. Moreover, apropos our implementation using matched expenditure and trade prices, exchange rate 
regimes and sources of economic growth may differ between industrial and developing countries. Are 
differences observed in the estimated activity and relative price coefficients between industrial and developing 
countries and across product groups? (tables 5a and 5b).  
F-tests of regressions including country fixed effects reject the null hypotheses that the industrial and 
developing countries regressions are the same, across all product groups and for each of the four product 
groups. Wald tests of the null hypothesis that short-run and long-run coefficients are the same are as noted.  
Summarizing key aspects of the tables:  
 
•  with respect to relative prices: The relative price coefficient is of the correct sign and significant for 
imports of consumer goods and capital goods from industrial countries; it is significant and of the correct 
sign for all product categories of exports. This is in contrast to the estimates that constrained the relative 
price coefficient to be the same for industrial and developing countries and that resulted in poorly 
estimated coefficients.  
 
•  with respect to activity: The elasticity for US capital goods exports to industrial countries does not 
differ significantly from that to developing countries; but US capital goods imports from industrial 
countries is more responsive in the short run and less responsive in the long run to US activity than 
imports from developing countries. US consumer goods exports to industrial countries respond 
differently to foreign activity in those high-income countries as compared with the response to activity in 
the developing countries. On the other hand, there is no difference in elasticity of US consumer goods 
imports with respect to source country.  
 
What does all this add up to in the context of the recent evolution of the US trade deficit? First, with 
respect to capital goods imports and exports, changing relative prices in industrial countries, and net trade, 
these coefficients are consistent with a story that dollar appreciation has, ceteris paribus, dampened capital 
goods exports and encouraged capital goods imports from the industrial countries. The depreciation of the 
dollar against these same currencies since 2002, and the somewhat higher pass-through of that exchange rate 
  15change vis-à-vis at least the euro14 may, ceteris paribus, turn around the net trade deficit in capital goods, 
which was described earlier in this paper. But, to the extent that an increasing share of these goods come 
from developing economies, any dollar depreciation may have less of an effect to reduce capital goods 
imports or expand capital goods exports to developing countries, given the lack of significance in the 
estimated coefficient for relative prices of capital goods for developing countries.15  
Second, with respect to changing investment activity, these coefficients are consistent with a story that 
robust US investment demand has encouraged imports of capital goods with a relatively higher elasticity, 
whereas slower investment growth abroad (both in the industrial and the developing world) has tended to 
yield slower growth in capital goods exports. Put together, the deterioration of net trade in capital goods 
comes from robust US investment, dollar appreciation, and the relatively slower investment growth abroad 
that is spread across both the industrial and the developing world.  
Third, the fact that the variety effect is smaller for imports than for exports suggests that variety 
importantly underpins US capital goods export growth, which is consistent with Schott’s (2004).  
For consumer goods, the story is somewhat different not only because the estimated US consumer 
demand elasticity is so high but also because relative prices are significant and relatively high for products 
from the industrial countries.  
First, with respect to changing relative prices in industrial countries and net trade in consumer goods, 
these coefficients are consistent with a story that dollar appreciation has, ceteris paribus, hurt consumer 
goods exports to industrial countries and, particularly given the higher relative price elasticity, encouraged 
consumer goods imports from industrial countries. The depreciation of the dollar against these same 
currencies since 2002, and the somewhat higher pass-through of that exchange rate change vis-à-vis at least 
the euro may, ceteris paribus, reduce the net trade deficit in consumer goods, which was described earlier in 
this paper. But, to the extent that an increasing share of these goods come from developing economies, any 
dollar depreciation may have less of an effect to reduce consumer goods imports, given the lack of 
significance in the estimated coefficient for relative prices of consumer goods from developing countries. 16  
Second, with respect to consumer demand growth and net trade, the coefficients are consistent with a 
story that robust US consumer demand along with a very high cyclical demand elasticity has encouraged 
imports of consumer goods and autos from all trading partners. Slower consumption growth abroad and that 
lower elasticity have tended to dampen exports of consumer goods. Put together, the deterioration of net 
                                                 
14 US import prices from the European Union have risen about 14 percent since the peak of the dollar in February 2002. 
This represents more than a 25 percent pass-through of the euro appreciation into US import prices. Import prices from 
Japan on the other hand have stayed stable since early 2002, in spite of a more than 25 percent appreciation of the yen 
against the dollar (Bureau of Labor Statistics).  
15 The large positive and significant long-run coefficient for relative price of capital goods imports from developing 
countries suggests another missing variable or that the variety variable needs additional work.  
16 The large positive and significant long-run coefficient for relative price of consumer goods imports from developing 
countries suggests another missing variable or that the variety variable needs additional work.  
 
  16trade in consumer goods comes from very strong US consumer demand growth, as well as dollar appreciation 
(with greater imports of luxury, price-sensitive goods from industrial countries and reduced exports of 
similarly price-sensitive goods to industrial countries).  
 
Is China Different?  
 
For a number of reasons, we might expect China to be different from other countries in this specification of 
US dynamic trade. China’s trade shares changed the most. Its net trade deficit is on the steepest trajectory. Its 
variety increased the most. Its exchange rates have changed the least. Table 6 reports regression results 
investigating whether China is appreciably different from the rest of the world in the consumer goods and 
capital goods categories. The bottom line is that the picture is mixed in terms of short-run versus long-run 
effects. The very large long-run estimates on US economic activity are consistent with the graphical evidence 
but arguably could not persist.   
 
Summary of Findings  
 
The paper prepared new estimates of the elasticity of US trade flows using bilateral trade data for 31 
countries, using different measures of expenditure, and including alternative measures of global supply and 
variety. We examine four categories of goods based on BEA’s end-use classification system—autos, ISM-ex, 
consumer goods, and capital goods. We consider whether industrial and developing countries differ in their 
elasticities and whether China is different.  
 
1.  Using expenditure by category group rather than GDP as the measure of “income” significantly reduces 
the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry and yields far more plausible values for these “income” elasticities.  
 
2.  The four product categories behave differently from an aggregated panel.  
 
3.  Variety is a significant variable, particularly for capital goods. Constructing this variable using 10-digit 
level trade from the Harmonized System may bear additional fruit.  
 
4.  Industrial and developing countries have different income and relative price elasticities for these four 
product groups. In particular, when industrial countries are distinguished from developing countries, the 
relative prices for industrial countries are the correct sign, significant, and of plausible values.  
 
  175.  China evidences some difference in behavior relative to the rest of the sample in terms of US imports of 
capital goods and US exports of capital and consumer goods.  
 
VII. IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTION FOR FURTHER WORK  
 
Do Changing Trade Shares Change Trade Elasticities?  
 
The results indicate that industrial and developing countries differ in their elasticities of activity and relative 
price. The shares of these two groups in trade have changed over time, in particular within product categories 
for imports. Figure 3 shows elasticities for economic activity from the regression that splits the panel into 
four product categories and allows the elasticities to vary across the industrial and developing countries 
(tables 5a and 5b). These estimated elasticities are reaggregated using the time-varying trade weights of these 
two groups and four product categories in US trade. The figure also shows the constant elasticities generated 
from the benchmark model—GDP as income from table 3 and the matched expenditure model with variety 
from table 4.  
For imports, there is a rising long-run expenditure elasticity of US imports and a somewhat time-
varying short-run elasticity. The time-varying short-run elasticity lies between the constant elasticity as 
estimated using the benchmark model with GDP and with the matched expenditure model. These results 
imply that the assumption of a constant elasticity of US imports with respect to US economic activity may 
have to be rejected and that projections of US imports based on the constant elasticity assumption may be 
flawed.  
For exports, country shares have changed less, hence there is little time-varying impact on the 
elasticity of US exports with respect to foreign activity either in the short or the long run. However, 
projecting exports using foreign GDP as the driver may overestimate exports, since both the matched 
expenditure and the time-varying estimate are lower than the elasticity of exports with respect to foreign 
GDP (benchmark model).  
  
Do These New Elasticities Predict Better?  
 
Research using the workhorse model often addresses the tension between the theoretical plausibility of the 
estimated elasticities, specifically the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry, and the affirmed excellence of these 
simple equations to predict US exports and imports in the short and medium terms. By using matched 
expenditure and trade prices and by disaggregating product groups and income class (industrial versus 
developing country), we “improve” on the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry, but do we “do better” at 
predictions?  
  18We will examine this question by comparing in-sample predictive performance of three alternative 
models, running the model forward from 1998 to 2003 using the estimated coefficients for both the short- 
and long-run values from a panel spanning the years 1980 to 1997 and the actual values from the right-hand-
side variables. We compare the actual with the predicted values in each year (table 7). The horse race is 
between the benchmark model that uses GDP and aggregated trade (table 3)—a formulation that many 
forecasters would use because they are interested in aggregate exports and imports; the matched expenditure 
model, with variety, with four separate product groups, and with industrial country dummies (tables 5a and 
5b); and finally a model that uses GDP as the measure of economic activity but uses the coefficients 
generated from the four product groups. The latter model acknowledges that often forecasters have access to 
GDP forecasts and research-based elasticities in the literature and care about a disaggregated product group; 
for example, a company selling capital goods to Europe or facing consumer goods import competition from 
China.  
In terms of the “bottom line,” measured as the sum of the in-sample predictive errors, for exports, 
our disaggregated estimates “do better” at predicting exports than does either of the other two models. For 
imports, even though we obtain more plausible values for the elasticities, our predictions are poor compared 
with the benchmark model that uses US GDP as the measure of expenditure. So, our findings address the 
puzzle that surprised Houthakker and Magee in their original study: the very low income elasticities for US 
exports. Our estimations suggest that these elasticities might in fact be closer to those of other industrial 
countries. But, we have more work to do on the import side to find elasticities that meet theoretical norms 
and also predict well. We suspect that missing variables on the import side would help to better predict 
imports. 
To determine where our matched expenditure model might be predicting the worst, we examined 
each of the four product groups comparing the model results for the matched expenditure, variety, and 
industrial-country dummies with the simple model that used the disaggregated coefficients and GDP as the 
driver of trade. Appendix tables A5.1 to A5.4 report the results. Within product groups, auto trade and 
consumer goods imports are least well explained in-sample by the new disaggregated model. But, in-sample 
prediction of consumer goods exports, industrial supplies and materials–excluding oil trade flows, and capital 
goods trade flows are better predicted in-sample by the matched expenditure and variety model than when 
GDP is used as the measure of economic activity. Hence, future work will focus on narrowing the country 






  19“What If” US Spending Had Been Slower and Foreign Spending Had Been Greater? 
 
In recent policymaker confabs such as the G-8, it has been common to call for increased US savings and 
greater foreign growth, as well as more flexibility in exchange rates. Suppose the United States had saved 
more and growth abroad had been faster, say between 1997 and 2003. How much would the US trade deficit 
have been different from the actual outcome?  
We use our model to “forecast” US trade to 2003 with the estimates obtained from regressions run 
on a panel spanning 1980 to 2003. As shown in figure 4, our model performs well through 2001. Yet it 
substantially underpredicts the size of the US trade deficit for 2002 and 2003, hinting at missing variables that 
have gained in importance in the determination of US trade recently. The same exercise also allows us to test 
which determinants of US trade have the greatest effect on the US trade balance.  
Given that the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry persists in our estimation, albeit somewhat smaller, 
lower assumed values for US investment and consumption (e.g., more US saving) have a greater effect in 
dampening the trade deficit than an assumed rise in foreign investment and consumption of the same 
percentage point magnitude.  
 
Conclusions and Further Work  
 
These new elasticities yield insights into the sources of the widening of the US trade deficit and help to 
understand the nature of global competition and how it is impacting broad sectors of the US economy. 
The differences in demand elasticities for consumer goods versus for other product categories—with 
consumer goods more responsive to consumption patterns in the United States—yields insights into how 
robust US consumer demand through trending lower household saving rates, as augmented by higher stock-
market valuation in the 1990s and residential housing values and tax cuts in the 2000s, contributes to 
widening the consumer goods share of the trade deficit.  
The differences in relative price elasticities between the industrial and developing countries—with 
relative prices significant and of correct sign for industrial countries but not for developing countries—yields 
insights into how certain exchange rate regimes, pricing-to-market behavior, or other factors more prevalent 
to developing country exporters mute the price signal, which is consistent with recent work on disaggregate 
pass-through (Campa and Goldberg 2004, Marazzi et al. 2005).  
The evidence from this analysis suggests that the matched-expenditure model for exports, 
disaggregated across commodity groups and income class (industrial versus developing), is worth continued 
investigation. Not only do the elasticities have more plausible values but also the equation performs better in-
sample than the benchmark model for exports. Simultaneous specification with an equation for relative prices 
warrants consideration.  
  20On the import side, the matched-expenditure disaggregated model yields more plausible values for 
trade elasticities. However, the in-sample predictive performance is much worse than for the benchmark 
model. To understand the factors underpinning robust US imports of consumer goods and autos, in 
particular, requires additional work. Future work will focus on narrowing the country set for trade in autos 
and investigating a more detailed variable for variety.  
Going forward, these new elasticities have implications for demand management and exchange rate 
policies. In particular, slack US exports appear importantly related to slack consumption and investment 
abroad, which has been masked by measures of GDP that incorporate net exports to the United States. On 
the other hand, factors beyond strong US consumer demand or love of variety are bolstering US imports of 
consumer goods. Different relative price elasticities between the industrial and developing countries suggest 
long-run implications for US trade of certain exchange rate regimes.  
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Industrial Goods and Materials
Total Trade Deficit
Private Services and Intellectual Property Rights
Transportation, Travel, and Military Service
 




Table 1  Trade share by principal end-use category (in percent) 
 
  Imports Exports 
  1980 2004 1980 2004 
ISM-ex  31 26 29 14 
Capital  goods  34 40 13 23 
Consumer goods   8  13  14  25 
Autos   8  11  11  15 
Other                 20  12  43  23 
 
Memo:  Trade as a  










ISM-ex = industrial supplies and materials, excluding oil 
 
Note: “Other” defined as petroleum products and feeds, foods, and beverages. 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
  
Table 2  Trade shares by country/region (in percent) 
 
Country/ Exports  Imports 
region 1980  2004  1980  2004 
Europe   33  23  19  22 
Canada  19 24 17 18 
Mexico    7  14    5  11 
Japan    9    6  13  9 
China    2    4    1  13 
Asia without China 
and Japan  15 18 20 18 
Latin America 
without Mexico  11    7  10    7 
Australia    1    2    1    1 
Other    3    2  14    3 
Note: “Other” includes Africa and international organizations. 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 












1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Western Europe  Canada  Asia and Pacific Japan Mexico China, Hong Kong, and Macao Western Hemisphere 
 
                   Note:  Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa not shown. 
 
                      Source: UN Comtrade database. 
 
  
Table 3  Estimates for activity and relative price elasticities for US exports and imports 
 










 1951–66  OLS  Goods and 
services 
–1.51 0.99 –1.03  1.68 
Hooper, 
























































Panel of 4 
categories of 








SR = short run 
LR = long run 
ECM = error correction model 
OLS = ordinary least squares 
*, ** = significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
# = significant at 10 percent 
 
a.   Imports: Null rejected for GDP as income; not rejected for relative prices  
      Exports: Null rejected for GDP as income; null rejected for relative prices 
b.   Imports: Null rejected for “activity”; not rejected for relative prices.  
  Exports: Null rejected at 1 percent level for “activity”; null rejected at 10 percent level of significance for relative  
prices. 
  
SR = short run 
Table 4   Regressions by commodity group with country fixed effects  
 






















0.88 **(LR)  4.66**  -0.25 (SR) 
1.56#(LR) 
0.48**(SR) 






1.37**(LR)  0.16  -0.40#(SR) 
3.64 (LR) 
3.73**(SR) 
1.69**(LR)  -0.21 





1.13**(LR)  0.92#  0.48(SR) 
1.35(LR) 
9.01**(SR) 






0.94**(LR)  0.99  -0.13 (SR) 
1.36 (LR) 
1.03**(SR) 


















1.09**(LR)  0.91**  -0.17(SR) 
0.16(LR) 
1.00** (SR) 
1.40** (LR)  0.70** 
LR = long run 
# = significant at 10 percent 
*, ** = significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
 
Wald Test:  Null hypothesis that SR and LR are the same 
Autos   
Imports: income coefficients reject; prices not reject  
Exports: income coefficients reject; prices reject at 5 percent level 
 
Capital goods 
Imports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
Exports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
 
Consumer goods 
Imports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
Exports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
 
Industrial supplies and materials-excluding oil (ISM-ex) 
Imports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
Exports: income coefficients reject, prices not reject 
  
Wald Test:  Null hypothesis that LR and SR are the same  
Table 5a   Import regressions using a dummy variable for industrial trading partner with country 






























5.01**(LR)  1.42** 
Consumer goods 
3.52 & (SR) 
1.32 & (LR) 
4.156** (SR) 
1.96* (SR) 
-1.35 ** (SR) 
-4.34 ** (LR) 
   0.86*  (SR) 
14.34** (LR)  -0.19 
Autos and parts 
 
8.16 **(SR) 
1.59 ** (LR) 
        9.72*  (SR) 














0.86(LR)  0.17 
SR = short run 
LR = long run 
& = dummy for industrial countries is not significant 
# = significant at 10 percent 
*, ** = significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
Capital goods: Expenditure for both groups rejects the null.   
Consumer goods: Relative price for both groups rejects the null.  
Autos: Expenditure for developing countries rejects the null 
Industrial supplies and materials-excluding oil (ISM-ex): Expenditure for developing countries rejects the   
null and for industrial country at the 10 percent level. 
 
LR = long run 






































-0.58 # (LR) 
0.014 (SR) 
0.022 (LR)  -0.12 
Autos and parts 
1.19 *(SR) 
0.66*(LR) 
1.41 ** (SR) 
1.22 ** (LR) 
-0.922 ** (SR) 
-1.55** (LR) 
0.043(SR) 
-0.19(LR)  0.79 
ISM-ex 
0.32 & (SR) 






-0.26 (LR)  -0.46 
SR = short run 
& = dummy for industrial countries is not significant 
# = significant at 10 percent 
*, ** = significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
 
Wald Test:  Null hypothesis that SR and LR are the same 
Capital goods: Expenditure for developing countries rejects the null.   
Consumer goods: Expenditure for developing countries reject (1 percent level); expenditure industrial 
countries reject (5 percent level); relative prices industrial countries reject (1 percent level).  
Autos: Expenditure for developing countries and relative prices for industrial countries reject the null.   
Industrial supplies and materials-excluding oil (ISM-ex): Expenditure for both groups reject; relative prices   
for industrial countries reject (5 percent level).  
  












price, rest of 
world 
Relative 



















12.5 (LR)  -0.13 
 
SR = short run 
 
















-0.58 # (LR) 
0.014 (SR) 
0.022 (LR)  0.4 
LR = long run 
& = dummy for China is not significant 
# = significant at 10 percent 
*, ** = significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
Rest of world =  All US trading partners except China  
Figure 3   Income elasticities for US imports and exports 
  



















































   




















































Source: Authors’ regression results; trade weights from UN Comtrade database. 
Table 7   Summary of in-sample predictive performance (billions of US dollars) 
 
Predictions 
  Actual 
Matched expenditure, variety, 
and industrial country dummies
(from tables 5a and 5b) 
GDP as income and aggregate 
trade flows 
(from table 3) 
GDP as income, product-specific 
coefficients 
Year  Imports  Exports  Net 
Exports 
Imports  Exports  Net 
Exports 
Imports  Exports  Net 
Exports 
Imports  Exports  Net 
Exports
1997  664  526  -138                   
1998  741  535  -206  795  543  -252  766  579  -187  767  572  -195 
1999  834  562  -272  886  564  -323  853  594  -259  859  587  -272 
2000  941  624  -318  983  621  -361  939  641  -298  946  635  -311 
2001  890  581  -308  1021  634  -387  982  665  -318  982  662  -320 
2002  938  560  -378  970  593  -377  952  603  -349  952  602  -349 
2003  975  572  -403  1050  613  -437  1025  586  -438  1039  586  -452 
                                                               Errors:  Prediction less actual value 
1998        54  8  -46  25  44  18  26  37  11 
1999        53  2  -51  19  32  13  25  25  0 
2000        41  -2  -44  -2  17  20  4  11  7 
2001        131  53  -78  93  84  -9  92  81  -11 
2002        32  33  1  14  43  29  13  42  29 
2003        74  40  -34  49  14  -35  63  14  -49 











Figure 4  “What if” scenarios: US net exports (billions of dollars) 
 









1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003
Net exports; our coefficients, true RHS data
plus 1%-point faster global investment growth
plus 1%-point faster global PCE growth
plus 1%-point slower US investment growth
plus 1%-point slower US PCE growth






PCE = personal consumption expenditure 
RHS = right-hand side 
 
Sources: Authors’ regression results and calculations; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Penn World Tables; IMF 
International Financial Statistics; Bureau of Labor Statistics; UN Comtrade database; University of British Columbia 
Pacific Exchange Rate database.  APPENDIX 
 































Chapter 2: crude materials inedible, 
except fuels.  
Chapter 4: animal and vegetable oils 
and waxes.  
51-53: organic and inorganic chemicals; 
dyeing, tanning and coloring supplies. 
551: Essential oils.  
56-59: fertilizers, explosives, plastics 
and miscellaneous chemical materials. 
611, 613: leather and fur.  
621, 628: rubber.  
633- 635: wood and cork manufactures 
(except 6354 for domestic use).  
64: paper and pulp.  
655-657: yarn and textiles.  
661-664: non-metallic mineral 
products.  
67, 68: iron and steel and non-ferrous 
metals.  
691-695, 699: manufactures of metal. 
776: semiconductors, cathodes, diodes, 
photocells, etc.  
81: sanitary, plumbing, heating and 
lighting fixtures and other building 
material. 
 
1221-1223: tobacco manufactured. 
5411-5419: pharmaceuticals and 
cosmetics.  
5530-5543: perfumes, soaps and 
detergents.  
6121-6129: articles of leather and 
footwear.  
6354: manufactures of wood for 
domestic use.  
6581-6597: textile and non-textile 
furnishings, floor coverings, rugs and 
other articles made from fabric. 6651-
6674: china, glassware, precious stones. 
6960-6978: household items made of 
metal.  
7611-7631: televisions, radio, etc.  
775: household appliances.  
785: motorcycles, bicycles and parts.  
821: furniture.  
8310: travel goods.  
84-85: apparel and footwear.  
88-89: photographic equipment, 
spectacles, watches, printed matter, 
and miscellaneous consumer goods. 
6253: tires for aircraft. 
71-75: heavy machines for all industrial 
sectors and agriculture, office 
machines. 
7641-7649: telecommunications and 
broadcasting equipment.  
771-774, 778: electrical equipment  
and electronic equipment.  
7911-7938: transport equipment other 
than road vehicles.  
87: laboratory and medical and other 
scientific equipment; precision 
instruments.  
7810-7849, 7861, 7869: road vehicles 
and parts except motorcycles and 
bicycles and their parts. 
6251, 6252: tires for road vehicles. 
 









Note: This table is constructed using the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2.Figure A1.1   Commodity shares of US exports 
(5-year moving average; billions of dollars; not shown: Africa, international  












































Industrial Goods and Materials
Source : Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 
Figure A1.2   Commodity shares of US imports
(5-year moving average; billions of dollars; n






































Industrial Goods and Materials
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 Figure A2.1  Country/area shares of US exports 
(5-year moving average; billions of dollars; not  shown: Africa, international  






















































































































Latin America without Mexico










Figure A2.2  Country/area shares of US imports 
(5-year moving average; billions of dollars; not shown: Africa, international  






















































































































Latin America without Mexico






Source : Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Figure A3.1  Economic activity variables 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Penn Wo  
 
 
rld Tables.  
























































































































9Figure A3.2  Relative US export prices 
  (index 1980=100) 
 





     Bureau of Labor Statistics; trade weights from UN Comtrade database.
 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; trade weights from UN Comtrade database. 
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198
1
Price  for total imports
Price for capital goods imports





Figure A4.1  Country/area shares of US capital goods exports 
(percent; residual: Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe, USSR/former Soviet Union) 
hares of US capital goods imports 

















































Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific Japan
Mexico China, HK and Macao Western Hemisphere
Source : UN Comtrade database.
 








1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere
  
                      Source: UN Comtrade database. 
 
 
 Figure A4.3  Country/area shares of US consumer goods exports 
 (percent; residual: Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe, USSR/former Soviet Union) 
 





































Western Europe Canada Asia and Pa
Figure A4.4   Country/area shares of US consumer goods imports 
cific
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere







1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific
120
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere
Source : UN Comtrade database.Figure A4.5  Country/area shares of US auto exports 
  (percent; residual: Africa, Eastern Europe, USSR/former Soviet Union) 


































Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere Middle East
Source: UN Comtrade database.
 
Figure A4.6  Country/area shares for US auto imports 










































































































Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere
Source : UN Comtrade database.Figure A4.7  Country/area shares of US industrial supplies exports 
            Source: UN Comtrade database.








































































































Western Europe Canada Asia and Pacific
Japan Mexico China, HK and Macao
Western Hemisphere Middle East
Source : UN Comtrade database.
 
Figure A4.8  Country/area shares of US industrial supplies imports 
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   Tabl .1  In-sample performance of models usin fficients: Consumer goods 









Imports Exports Net exports Imports
e 
  

















ports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports
1998 194.17 75.43 -118.73 218.91 6.65 -142.26 198.40 81.66 -116.73
1999 215.54 79.11 -136.43 248.97 8.42 -170.55 223.09 83.25 -139.84
2000 247.39 89.91 -157.48 271.88 3.42 -188.46 242.38 89.81 -152.56
2001 246.00 87.76 -158.24 290.79 2.86 -197.92 258.95 96.70 -162.25
2002 268.59 83.84 -184.75 286.06 7.53 -198.53 262.27 90.65 -171.62
2003 290.79 89.41 -201.38 318.87 7.45 -231.42 297.83 86.67 -211.16
1998 24.74 .21 4.23 6.23
1999 33.43 0.69 7.55 4.15
2000 24.49 6.49 -5.02 -0.10
2001 44.78 .10 12.94 8.94
2002 17.47 .69 -6.32 6.81
2003 28.08 1.96 7.04 -2.75
Total error 172.99 .87 20.43 23.27
Actual data 
Match enditure w/variety 
and ind -country dummies GDP model Year
ed 
ustTable A5.2  In-sample performance of models using short-run coefficients: Capital goods 
  (billions of dollars) 
 
Year
Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports
1998 229.95 231.33 1.38 212.85 236.63 23.78 218.09 248.10 30.01
1999 262.27 241.97 -20.30 242.52 248.02 5.49 254.28 254.53 0.25
2000 312.02 270.07 -41.95 273.39 277.47 4.08 285.69 277.54 -8.16
2001 290.13 251.96 -38.17 306.30 282.53 -23.76 318.26 296.35 -21.91
2002 295.21 231.81 -63.41 293.92 261.89 -32.03 308.71 261.25 -47.46
2003 313.64 231.11 -82.53 301.08 262.21 -38.87 318.05 245.31 -72.74
1998 -17.10 5.30 -11.85 16.77
1999 -19.75 6.04 -8.00 12.56
2000 -38.62 7.40 -26.33 7.47
2001 16.17 30.58 28.12 44.39
2002 -1.30 30.08 13.50 29.45
2003 -12.56 31.10 4.41 14.20
Total error -73.16 110.50 -0.15 124.83
Actual data 
Matched expenditure w/variety and 








 Table A5.3  In-sample performance of models using short-run coefficients: Autos 
  (billions of dollars) 
Year
Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports
1998 126.11 53.72 -72.39 168.23 60.10 -108.13 146.88 63.50 -83.38
1999 150.39 54.72 -95.68 187.83 58.51 -129.31 159.39 63.67 -95.71
2000 163.51 57.47 -106.04 218.86 61.51 -157.35 185.02 68.46 -116.56
2001 157.50 53.20 -104.30 219.33 61.86 -157.47 180.30 62.60 -117.70
2002 168.72 56.68 -112.04 199.51 54.75 -144.76 169.59 56.40 -113.20
2003 171.46 58.49 -112.97 216.95 66.53 -150.42 194.41 61.68 -132.73
1998 42.12 6.38 20.77 9.78
1999 37.43 3.80 9.00 8.96
2000 55.34 4.04 21.51 10.99
2001 61.83 8.67 22.80 9.40
2002 30.80 -1.93 0.88 -0.28
2003 45.49 8.04 22.95 3.19
Total error 273.02 28.99 97.91 42.04
Matched expenditure w/variety and 
industrial-country dummies Actual data  GDP model




oil (billions of dolla
Year
Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports Imports Exports Net exports
1998 190.50 174.61 -15.89 194.73 169.35 -25.37 203.72 178.97 -24.75
1999 205.57 185.93 -19.64 207.15 178.82 -28.33 222.24 185.47 -36.77
2000 218.52 206.29 -12.23 218.74 198.99 -19.75 232.46 198.74 -33.72
2001 195.87 188.16 -7.71 204.55 196.81 -7.74 224.44 206.78 -17.66
2002 205.73 187.59 -18.14 190.59 188.91 -1.68 211.08 193.93 -17.15
2003 199.57 193.47 -6.09 212.94 196.47 -16.48 228.34 192.58 -35.76
1998 4.23 -5.25 13.22 4.36
1999 1.58 -7.11 16.67 -0.46
2000 0.22 -7.30 13.94 -7.56
2001 8.68 8.66 28.57 18.62
2002 -15.14 1.32 5.35 6.34
2003 13.38 2.99 28.78 -0.89
Total error 12.94 -6.69 106.52 20.41
Actual data 
Matched expenditure w/variety and 
industrial-country dummies GDP model